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This thesis employs novel datasets on patenting activity and TFP in the 
GDR to study the relationship between innovation and productivity. 
Patenting activity is chosen as a variable of interest due to its inherent 
link to the innovative process and high international and intertemporal 
comparability. No statistically significant relationship between patenting 
and future productivity growth is found in an analysis across 16 sectors 
of the GDR’s economy from 1950-1989. This result is unusual, and likely 
results out of the institutional framework of the GDR: firstly, it being a 
planned economy and the associated reduced productivity effects of 
innovations, and secondly, the GDR’s unique patent system which likely 
increased the number of patent applications while reducing their 
economic usefulness. By including the full breadth of the GDR’s patent 
stock, as well as robustly estimating the initial capital stock of the GDR, 
a more reliable account of both these variables can be made than was 
possible in previous studies. This thesis contributes to the literature 
through its use of new data and an adaptation of a proven empirical 
identification strategy to a new context. It also suggests avenues for 
further research on the relationship between patenting and innovation in 




The German Democratic Republic, or GDR, was a socialist bridgehead in the 
developed world, and in many respects the jewel in the crown of soviet-aligned 
economies. Nonetheless, in comparison with their “compatriots” due West, 
citizens of the GDR lived less free and less prosperous lives. This was partially 
due to the weaknesses inherent to all planned economies, and partially due to 
the suboptimal endowments of the GDR’s territory.  
 
The GDR’s state-led R&D programmes were driven by severe structural 
disproportions that afflicted the East German economy from the end of WWII to 
Reunification. The issue was not so much that East Germany was economically 
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backwards, but that put simply, it was an “incomplete” economy.1 Its 
endowments in capital were not distributed equally throughout the value chain: 
while it had an established consumer goods industry, it was lacking in primary 
and capital goods production.2 This led to problems in supplying its industry, 
that were compounded by its weak transport sector, which had suffered severe 
war damage and dismantlement, which could not be repaired easily due to a lack 
of domestic steel capacity – in fact, East German railways would never again 
have as much track as before the war.3 Without trade with the rest of Germany 
and the world, the East German economy could not function properly.4 The 
autarky required of East Germany by the low-trade environment in the post-war 
communist bloc reduced the scope for “Smithian” gains from specialisation and 
required immense investments, which were already predicted to be a major drain 
on the East German economy in 1948.5 For an example: the East German 
metalworking industry produced 65% of the entire worldwide product portfolio, 
whereas the FRG’s only produced 17%.6 At the same time, the communist system 
promised improved living standards for the masses and abundance for all. This 
generated a crushing “internal contradiction” (even though the GDR hoped to 
escape the Marxian contradictions of Capitalism): Communism promised higher 
living standards, but reaching these given the GDR’s endowments required 
massive investments, which in turn, required restraint in living standards – 
contradicting the promise of socialist bounty. This fundamental and structural 
problem was not lost on the GDR’s leadership and would ultimately prove the 
GDR’s undoing, and the GDR’s leadership settled on technological improvement 
as the only way to ultimately overcome the problem. 
 
But this project failed: the GDR’s flagship high-technology enterprise, Robotron, 
only introduced the 1MB microchip (to great fanfare) a full six years after it had 
 
1 Karlsch, Allein Bezahlt? 
2 Ritschl and Vonyó, ‘The Roots of Economic Failure’, 169–71. 
3 Ritschl and Vonyó, 176–77; Karlsch, Allein Bezahlt?, 91. 
4 Karlsch, Allein Bezahlt?, 92. 
5 Karlsch, 43. 
6 Dale, Between State Capitalism and Globalisation, 165. 
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been developed in the West. In other segments of the economy, the GDR 
similarly lay well behind the global cutting edge (its most-produced car, which 
had a years-long waitlist, was designed in the 1950s).  
 
In this dissertation, I study the link between the GDR’s research and 
development complex and its economy through the vector of patenting. I choose 
patenting because it is the most internationally comparable and constant 
institutionalised manifestation of innovation outcomes. My thesis will answer 
the research question “what was the link between patenting and productivity in 
the GDR” in four major parts. Firstly, I review the literature on the link of 
patenting and productivity internationally, introduce peculiarities of the GDR 
and studies on the local links between TFP and innovation. Secondly, I provide 
context on my research and generate hypotheses in a historiographical section. 
Thirdly, I introduce my empirical method, which is adapted from the literature, 
and the data series I have compiled. Finally, I provide and discuss my statistical 
results.  
 
I do not find a statistically significant relationship between patenting and 
productivity, and propose that this is due to the institutional structure of the 
GDR’s economy and patent system, which creates a “noisier” set of patent data 
that requires intense archival research to supplement. I propose some further 
avenues of research using data that exists in German archives but could not be 




In this section I will first illustrate the relationship between innovation, patents 
and productivity, which is not straightforward. As Figure 1 illustrates, not only 
is productivity strongly affected through non-patent channels that relate to 
knowledge, but also by factors completely unrelated to knowledge. Patents 
provide an indicator of the former, the stock of knowledge that can be employed 
in production because, generally, they let the patentee monopolise the use of an 
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invention as a “reward” for disseminating the contents of the invention in form of 
the patent.7 But difficulties remain. For instance, the propensity to patent 
innovations differs substantially by sector as the ease of circumventing patents 
varies significantly depending on the field.8 Moreover, patents do not perfectly 
measure improvements to production, as "A Patent is not an innovation, but […] 
patent information constitutes some kind of a bridge between the results of a 
particular company’s R&D activity and implementation activity".9 Since the 
relationship is indirect, “Patent Metadata” like citations and licenses, the 
longevity of the patent, and the size of the patent family can also provide 
insights.10 A number of approaches that have used such data have yielded 
interesting results and will be described in the following literature review. 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between patents and productivity 
 
Adapted from Nagaoka et al. (2010) to fit the GDR’s institutional context.11 
 
 
7 Plant, ‘The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions’. 
8 Horstmann, MacDonald, and Slivinski, ‘Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms’, 828. 
9 Wisła, ‘Patent Data in Economic Analysis’, 75. 
10 Wisła, 76. 
11 Nagaoka, Motohashi, and Goto, ‘Patent Statistics as an Innovation Indicator’, 1105 fig. 10; 
adapted from Pakes and Griliches, ‘Patents and R and D at the Firm Level’. 






    
         
          
             
                
         
              
       
      
                        
                                  
         
          
         
          
               
                                                       
5 
 
Part I: Innovation, patents, and productivity internationally 
Stock of knowledge 
One way to interpret patents is as elements of the stock of knowledge, as for 
instance Griffith et al. (2004) do.12 They analyse the stock of knowledge, 
consisting of a depreciated stock of patents, and propose that the rate of return 
to this stock of knowledge depends on the distance from the TFP frontier. They 
find a significant and positive relationship between patents and TFP. Cubel and 
Esteve add international trade as a source of knowledge transfer and consider 
also the stock of knowledge of trading partners, similarly finding a significant 
positive relationship.13 Naudé and Nagler use the number of successful patent 
applications as an indicator in the relationship between innovation and 
productivity in (West) Germany and argue that these provide a good indicator, 
allowing them to conclude that factors such as insufficient entrepreneurialism 
drove weaknesses in productivity growth in particular eras.14 
 
Distinguishing patents by their economic value 
As only a minority of patents are ever used, and only a minority of those provide 
substantial economic value, researchers can improve their findings by using 
metadata to distinguish between patents. The main measures are patent 
citations and patent longevity. The first measure, citations, is employed by Hall 
et al. (2005) to show that firms with patents that receive more citations have 
higher market valuations than those with fewer citations, all other things being 
equal.15 The second measure, patent longevity, is used in many different papers 
and takes advantage of the fact that most countries charge periodic and 
escalating “renewal fees” to inventors to maintain the monopoly granted by a 
patent.16 Schankerman and Pakes pioneered this approach for the post-1950 
period in Europe, finding that renewal data shows a highly skewed distribution 
 
12 Griffith, Redding, and Reenen, ‘Mapping the Two Faces of R&D’. 
13 Cubel and Esteve, ‘The Effect of Foreign and Domestic Patents on Total Factor Productivity 
during the Second Half of the 20th Century’. 
14 Naudé and Nagler, ‘Technological Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Productivity in Germany, 
1871-2015’. 
15 Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, ‘Market Value and Patent Citations’. 
16 Wisła, ‘Patent Data in Economic Analysis’. 
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of the economic value of patents and a relatively high “depreciation rate”.17 In 
the German context, Streb et al (2006) and Burhop (2010) use the longevity of 
patents to estimate their value, which lets them understand the role of high-
value patents in knowledge transmission throughout the economy.18  
 
From this brief review of the international literature, it is evident that there is a 
link between patents and productivity, but that it is contingent on several factors 
whose which should be considered in research. 
 
Intermezzo: Unique Challenges in studying the GDR 
Patent data is always to some extent tied to a national context, and this is 
doubly true in the GDR because of its socialist character and several historical 
factors unique to a country borne out of partition. In the following, I will briefly 
introduce how the innovation system itself, as well as the transmission of 
innovations into productivity was profoundly affected by the Socialist model, and 
how consequently the approach to studying the relationship between patenting 
and innovation must be adapted.  
 
Innovation in planned economies 
Productivity in planned economies is usually lower than in market economies, 
and one reason put forth for this is that planned economies are fundamentally 
worse at improving productivity through innovation. Chiang (1990) provides a 
rigorous argument for why planned economies are expected to fare worse than 
their free-market counterparts in implementing innovations. Managers in 
planned economies are rewarded or punished according to their ability to fulfil 
production quotas, which means that they are loath to take the risk associated 
with implementing a new technique, which might pay off over the longer term 
but cause short-term disruptions in production.19 In the GDR, this phenomenon 
 
17 Schankerman and Pakes, ‘Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries 
During the Post-1950 Period’. 
18 Streb, Baten, and Yin, ‘Technological and Geographical Knowledge Spillover in the German 
Empire 1877-1918’; Burhop, ‘The Transfer of Patents in Imperial Germany’. 
19 Chiang, ‘Management of Technology in Centrally Planned Economies’. 
7 
 
is well-documented and derided as the “ton ideology,” because as plans often 
specified output targets by weight, improvements to the quality and usefulness 
of actual products were not important – and could even hinder the fulfilment of 
plan goals  if they entailed creating a lighter product!20 Moreover, while planned 
economies like the GDR could produce high-quality research in many areas, 
applied scientific work at some point relied on outputs of the industrial sector, 
which often could not provide the adequate instruments and raw materials. 
Lamenting the difficulty of progressing in research when there was not an 
ecosystem of high-quality suppliers, the Carl Zeiss researcher Paul Görlich 
complained that “In the West, competition and the general pace of development 
[force] even the smallest operation to produce world-class products (or go under), 
whereas in our country a tired pace lacking in energy is accompanied by slogans 
[exhorting East Germans to try to reach] the worldwide level [of technological 
development]."21 Thus, progress was hindered by structural problems inherent to 
planned economies, both in the adoption of innovations and in the creation of 
innovative output itself. As such, the link between research and development 
and productivity improvements is weaker in the GDR than elsewhere. 
 
Political interference in research  
To examine this link, one must also consider that the research process could not 
proceed unimpeded. The GDR’s leadership pursued autarkic policies, which did 
much to misdirect research and investment. For instance, many attempts were 
made to substitute oil with coal in petrochemical processes, although this was 
not promising.22 The microelectronics field, which was particularly dear to the 
Politburo (one might call it a white elephant) was also held back by political 
interference. Research of thin-film microelectronics was prioritised over 
transistors, despite the fact that this was not considered a promising field 
 
20 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 88. 
21 Augustine, 164. 
22 Stokes, ‘Von Trabbi Und Acetylen - Die Technikentwicklung’. 
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anywhere and Werner Hartmann, the leader in the field in the GDR, strenuously 
objected.23  
 
In some fields, the GDR attempted to jump-start its technological progress by 
way of directly copying western products. Microelectronics was a major priority 
for the GDR’s leadership and saw the first clandestine copying of foreign 
microchips in 1967.24 Since this was illegal, it led to a culture of secrecy which 
harmed innovation flows between teams and especially between institutions. It 
also made it difficult to sell goods abroad – copyright violations were quite 
obvious to foreign buyers.25 
 
Microelectronics suffered particularly badly from MfS activities, as Hartmann 
was disgraced due to (unfounded) suspicions of sabotage, robbing the 
microelectronics research establishment of one of its most brilliant and 
important leaders.26 His colleague Paul Görlich, who was cited above 
complaining about the difficulty of creating excellent work in a planned economy, 
was also ousted due to suspicions of espionage. All this was despite the fact that 
the GDR microelectronics field was several years behind the world leaders and 
the GDR leadership put a great deal of faith in the potential for high technology 
to solve intrinsic problems of the GDR’s economy (more on that later). 
 
The Patent system 
An additional issue that arises out of the GDR being a socialist country is the 
specific structure of the GDR patent system, which differs from non-socialist 
countries. The politicians, officials, and planners of the GDR were firm believers 
in the power of technology, which motivated them to quickly re-establish the 
patent system after the chaos of the post-war years.27 Moreover, planners 
wanted to take advantage of the international knowledge flows created by the 
 
23 Augustine, ‘Management of Technological Innovation’. 
24 Augustine. 
25 Augustine. 
26 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 165. 
27 Wiessner, ‘Das Patentrecht der DDR’, 241–43. 
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patent system, which is why the GDR joined international treaties on patent 
standardisation. However, they were quite opposed to the monopolistic 
associations of the concept of the patent.28 As such, the 1950 patent law had 
initially only permitted the “Wirtschaftspatent”, in which patentees could not 
prohibit anyone from using their invention – instead, potential licensees 
approached the patent office (Amt für Erfindungs- und Patentwesen, or AfEP) 
for the permission to use the patent. Whether or not this permission was granted 
was the discretion of AfEP and would result in the payment of a license fee to the 
patentee.29 This contrasts heavily with the usual practice in capitalist societies, 
in which the holders of patents have the exclusive right to decide on their use.30 
The Wirtschaftspatent had obvious limitations. Firstly, it conflicted with Paris 
treaties on the harmonisation of international patents, which the GDR was party 
to.31 Secondly, it was unattractive to foreign patentees, who would not accede to 
the mandatory licensing of the Wirtschaftspatent.32 This would have cut the 
GDR off from a vital source of international knowledge transfer and harmed the 
potential for technology-enabled growth. As such, the patent office introduced 
the “Ausschließungspatent” which conferred a right to exclude – although this 
was almost exclusively issued to international patentees, and made up a 
minority of patents.33 Since the majority of patents did not convey the exclusive 
right to use an innovation, patents differ fundamentally as an output of the R&D 
system and as a factor of productivity improvement. For instance, the proportion 
of patents that are actually used is around 50% for most countries,34 but was 
only 20% in the GDR,35 which makes it all the more important to use some 
method to assess the value of patents.  
 
28 Wiessner, 254. 
29 Wiessner, 253–54. 
30 Plant, ‘The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions’. 
31 Wiessner, ‘Das Patentrecht der DDR’, 259. 
32 Wiessner, 259. 
33 Wiessner, 259. 
34 Motohashi, ‘Licensing or Not Licensing?’; in Nagaoka, Motohashi, and Goto, ‘Patent Statistics 
as an Innovation Indicator’, 1110. 
35 Lindig, ‘Ausgewählte Rahmenbedingungen Des Erfinderischen Schaffens in Der DDR’. 
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Moreover, understanding the patenting activities of firms in the GDR is very 
difficult. Firstly, there was substantial reorganisation of the economy (initial 
nationalisation, creation of VVB and later Kombinate, etc.) which creates 
continuity problems. More importantly, the usual distinction between “inventor” 
and “applicant” (i.e. patent owner) was simply not made in the 1960s, except for 
foreign patents.36 This creates a period for which hardly any organisation-level 
patenting data can be constructed from the DEPATISnet dataset. Another issue 
is that data on the GDR’s innovation activity is relatively scarce. Firstly, 
international patent databases like PATSTAT generally do not contain any 
reliable information on GDR patents before 1973. Secondly, the data that does 
exist is structurally different from that found in other systems. For instance, the 
number of patent citations is not useful, both due to unreliable databases and 
because GDR citation rates are significantly lower – this might be due to lower 
international trade or other systemic differences (or indeed simply due to their 
lower value). The most cited patent from the GDR has 893 citations, compared to 
6304 for the FRG.37 Secondly, Patent longevity data is generally not available: 
Patents lasted for 18 years and did not have to be renewed.38 Finally, data on 
patent families is scarce, especially before 1973 – at which point there was a dire 
lack of hard currency in the GDR which was more needed elsewhere than for 
international patenting. Alternative data exists, but is in difficult-to-access 
archives. As such, studies on patenting and productivity in the GDR must 
overcome limitations in the availability of data. 
 
Part II: Innovation, Patents, and Productivity in the GDR  
Accordingly, many studies on productivity and innovation in the GDR have not 
used patent data, in many cases reviewing qualitative evidence and company 
instead. Augustine (2007, 2020) argues that in the microelectronics sector, 
innovation in scientific terms (the production of new scientific findings) was 
strong, but hurt by politically motivated firings of key staff. This also hurt the 
 
36 Kogut and Zander, ‘Did Socialism Fail to Innovate?’ 
37 PATSTAT online, accessed 26.08.2021 
38 Wiessner, ‘Das Patentrecht der DDR’. 
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implementation of scientific knowledge into productivity-enhancing 
improvements, which was poor in any case. Moreover, the problems associated 
with illicit copying mentioned above worsened both scientific and implementation 
outcomes.39 Other studies particularly focus on the integration of the GDR into 
the communist bloc as a source of frictions in the innovative process. Fengler 
finds that the Filmfabrik Wolfen suffered particularly because of decisions to 
integrate completely into the communist bloc, which made it difficult to reach 
the technological frontier.40 Schiefer’s extensive study of the petrochemical sector 
and notes key differences in the power of the Stasi between firms.41 Stokes also 
notes the friction caused by the fact that existing linkages to researchers and 
suppliers were cut and replaced by exchanges of personnel and know-how with 
the Eastern Bloc.42 There have also been several studies on productivity and 
innovation in the wider eastern bloc which I can only briefly mention here. 
Broadberry and Klein argue that Czech planners created acceptable productivity 
growth until the age of “flexible mass production.”43  Allen instead holds that 
Soviet productivity growth slows down around the 1970s as excessive focus is put 
on the military in R&D and investments.44 Vonyó similarly considers initial 
underinvestment and subsequent misallocation of investments to be a major 
drag on productivity growth.45 His criticism of official investment figures 
vindicates this thesis’ approach, mirroring Glitz and Meyersson (2020) of relying 
on Heske’s revised investment estimates.46 
 
A case study approach 
Kogut and Zander (2000) use a case study approach to study the Carl Zeiss 
company that was split after the war.47 At this point, many scientists and 
 
39 Augustine, Red Prometheus; Augustine, ‘Management of Technological Innovation’. 
40 Fengler, ‘Innovation in a Centrally Planned Economy: The Case of the Filmfabrik Wolfen’. 
41 Schiefer, Profiteur Der Krise. 
42 Stokes, ‘Von Trabbi Und Acetylen - Die Technikentwicklung’. 
43 Broadberry and Klein, ‘When and Why Did Eastern European Economies Begin to Fail?’ 
44 Allen, ‘The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy’. 
45 Vonyó, ‘War and Socialism’. 
46 Glitz and Meyersson, ‘Industrial Espionage and Productivity’; Heske, ‘Value Added, 
Employment and Capital Expenditures in the East German Industry, 1950-2000’. 
47 Kogut and Zander, ‘Did Socialism Fail to Innovate?’ 
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technicians left for the new location in Oberkochen in Swabia, while the 
intellectual property and other capital remained in Jena. They analyse the 
correlation between technical field of patents filed by the two Zeiss firms and 
find a very high degree of continuity, despite the split. They note that VEB (and 
later Kombinat) Carl Zeiss Jena was highly innovative in many fields and saw 
great successes in photomask manufacturing (needed for semiconductor 
production) which Carl Zeiss Oberkochen was not a serious player in. Their title 
“Did socialism fail to innovate” suggests a potential for making generalised 
conclusions from the results on Zeiss, but this is complicated by the fact that 
Zeiss was a passion project for Walter Ulbricht and played a major role in the 
armaments research industry, even coming to the attention of Leonid Brezhnev 
himself.48 Zeiss, while a fascinating case study, simply lacks generalisability to 
the wider GDR economy.  
 
Comparing the GDR with the FRG 
Glitz and Meyersson (hereafter: GM2020) conducted a landmark study of GDR 
productivity and how it relates to industrial espionage, also accounting for 
patenting. My own approach is significantly indebted to their work, which is why 
I describe the data, method, and results in the GM2020 paper in great detail 
here. Considering the structural impediments to the implementation of new 
technologies in planned economies, they propose that patenting is unlikely to be 
a good predictor of productivity improvements. Instead, they analyse industrial 
espionage activities by the MfS as a likely source of more economically useful 
knowledge inflows. This has been an area of interest for research at least since 
an MfS defector turned over troves of Data to German authorities in 1979.49 The 
opinions on the actual effects of espionage differ, however: while some 
researchers discount the effectiveness of the espionage programme, Glitz and 
 
48 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 183; Augustine, ‘Management of Technological Innovation’, 11. 
49 SPIEGEL, ‘DDR-Spionage’. 
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Meyersson find it to have reduced the TFP gap between East and West 
Germany.50  
 
GM2020 use panel data on patenting, TFP, and MfS industrial espionage on 16 
different sectors in the GDR and FRG. They create the TFP time series by using 
a dataset compiled by Gerhard Heske, a former member of the GDR’s State 
Planning commission, who was engaged in a multi-year project of revising the 
official (i.e., formerly classified) figures on employment, investment, output, and 
price inflation.51 This dataset is among the most reliable available for the GDR, 
and Heske is a true expert in the field. Using this dataset, they construct a 
number of TFP series with different underlying assumptions on the initial 
capital stock. 
 
For their patent data in the GDR, they use a dataset of GDR patents obtained 
from AfEP records which lists all patents applied for by each Kombinat, which 
can then be assigned to sectors through the activity of the specific Kombinat. The 
dataset runs from 1971 to 1989. For the FRG, they obtain data from 
DEPATISnet which is assigned to a particular sector using a concordance table 
between the patent class (IPC) and the International Standard Industry 
Classification (ISIC).52 This dataset runs from 1970-1989. The main focus of the 
analysis is not patenting but industrial espionage, for which they construct a 
variable based on a database on Stasi activities.  
 
Their regression model is a dynamic panel regression of the gap in TFP between 
east and West on several independent variables with a three-year lag, analysing 
multiple overlapping three-year windows with year and sector fixed effects. They 
have three major results. First, without including the lagged TFP gap in the 
independent variables, the coefficient on the lagged patent gap is positive and 
 
50 For comparison: Macrakis, ‘Das Ringen um den technischen Höchststand: Spionage und 
Technologietransfer in der DDR’. 
51 Heske, ‘Value Added, Employment and Capital Expenditures in the East German Industry, 
1950-2000’. 
52 Verspagen, van Moergastel, and Slabbers, ‘MERIT Concordance Table: IPC - ISIC (Rev. 2)’. 
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statistically significant. Secondly, when including the lagged TFP gap, the 
coefficient on the lagged patent gap is not significant, but the lagged TFP gap is 
highly significant. Finally, when including lagged industrial espionage, the 
coefficient on espionage is positive and significant, as is the coefficient on the 
TFP gap, but patents are non-significant.53 They conclude that the GDR’s 
economy benefitted very strongly from MfS espionage and suggest that the Stasi 
was uniquely effective in its task, potentially due to the cultural closeness of the 




There is clear evidence that internationally, there is a link between patents, 
innovation, and productivity. But the only study that addresses this link directly 
employs a comparative approach and is mostly focused on studying the impacts 
of industrial espionage, with an only incidental use of patent statistics. While 
their findings are interesting, concerns remain about the comparability of their 
data, due to the different attribution of patents to sector. As such, I believe that 
when using a different dataset, a significant improvement can be obtained in the 
understanding of the link between patenting and productivity in the GDR.  
 
The historical circumstances of the GDR mean that patent data needs to be 
treated uniquely. Firstly, I wish to argue that the GDR’s patent law likely makes 
patents a better measure of the pure, unweighted output of R&D activity than in 
other countries. This is because the drawbacks of patenting (revealing sensitive 
information, patenting/renewal fees) are absent in a planned economy without 
competitive pressure, the benefits of patenting, though reduced in comparison to 
market economies, were still present: user fees were paid to patentees and 
prolific inventors could receive medals and honours such as “Verdienter 
Erfinder.”55 However, this means that patents are more likely to be economically 
 
53 Glitz and Meyersson, ‘Industrial Espionage and Productivity’. 
54 Glitz and Meyersson. 
55 Wiessner, ‘Das Patentrecht der DDR’. 
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useless, since important “filtering” such as initial fees and renewal fees are 
absent in the GDR context, as demonstrated by the lower utilisation rate of 
patents in the GDR of 20% rather than 50%. As such, while they likely to be a 
“purer” measure of R&D output, they are also likely to be noisier as they will 
contain more results of low applicability. At the same time, the complications in 
planned economies noted above mean that patent applications are likely a 
relatively worse measure of innovation that improves productivity. Absent 
competition and a profit motive, there was very little reason to attempt an 
innovative strategy if this conflicted at all with planned output goals. This 
means that the overall link between patenting activity and productivity growth 
is likely to be smaller in the GDR than elsewhere. As such, I want to evaluate 
whether the number of patent applications in a given sector of the economy in 




To provide a better understanding of the subject matter, as well as elaborate on 
the specific challenges inherent to working in the GDR, I will now provide some 
general historical background on the GDR’s economy and research system. This 




In the Research and Innovation sphere, the post-war years saw a scramble for 
talent between the Eastern and Western blocs. While both sides were happy to 
ignore complicity or even active involvement in Nazi crimes, the Soviets were 
particularly lenient.56 Many scientists were recruited to work in remote research 
institutions in desolate areas like Siberia. In some cases, this recruitment was 
forced and wholly unwelcome, but in other cases Soviets recruited scientists with 
generous pay and other perks – researchers were permitted to take family, 
 
56 Augustine, Red Prometheus. 
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furniture, even lovers to the remote research institutes they were expected to 
work at for the future.57 During this time, many became exposed to socialism and 
found it far more benign than the dreadful caricature presented by Nazi 
propaganda, some even coming to prefer it to Western-style liberal democracy for 
Germany.58 The GDR leadership found it easy to rehabilitate even previously 
ardent Nazis as the scramble for talent and the need to construct the scientific 
establishment that would lead to the development of socialism presented a more 
important imperative that the righting of historical wrongs.59 
 
1950s 
The 1950s saw the gradual return of scientists and researchers from their 
“leaves of absence” in the USSR. But not all was well for the R&D establishment, 
as the better political freedoms and higher living standards in West Germany 
continued attracting talent. The GDR needed to urgently improve the living 
standards of the technical intelligentsia (and other segments of society) to reduce 
emigration, but instead it enacted real wage cuts in 1953 that triggered a 
popular uprising that had to be crushed by the Red Army. 60 
 
This policy was necessitated by the dual burden of Soviet Reparations and severe 
production bottlenecks. Thus, the first five-year plan was forced to invest in the 
primary sector and low-value added products like basic chemicals instead of 
building up high-value added sectors such as synthetic fibres or consumer goods. 
61  However, the 1953 uprising led to a lasting fear of imposing wage restraint to 
finance investments on part of the SED (recalling the dilemma introduced 
above), and so while Investment in the primary sector remained high in the 
1950s, other sectors saw less investment than their West German counterparts 
and productivity growth was sluggish.62 Moreover, emigration remained a major 
 
57 Augustine, 7–12. 
58 Augustine, 15–18. 
59 Augustine, 31. 
60 Ritschl, ‘An Exercise in Futility’, 514. 
61 Karlsch, Allein Bezahlt?, 114; Ritschl, ‘An Exercise in Futility’, 513. 
62 Ritschl, ‘An Exercise in Futility’, 514–17. 
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problem as seen in Figure 1. Amazingly, while the western world was generally 
experiencing a “baby boom”, the GDR’s population continuously declined! Over a 
million mostly young and educated people fled to the more prosperous and freer 
west before 1961, reducing the human capital stock of the GDR.63  
 
Figure 2: Population in the GDR, 1950-1989 
 
 
Source: Franzmann 2007, ZA826764 
 
Under this early paradigm of lasting economic woes, the GDR leadership quickly 
settled on technological progress as the only hope for lasting prosperity in the 
GDR.65 This belief in a deus ex machina  to help save the regime was maintained 
throughout the GDR’s history, in an ironic continuation of the Third Reich’s 
obsession with building a high-tech Wunderwaffe to win an unwinnable war.66 To 
this end, science was politicised like other parts of society in order to produce 
 
63 Karlsch, Allein Bezahlt?, 44. 
64 Franzmann, ‘Bevölkerung in Der Ehemaligen DDR 1946-1989’. 
65 Stokes, ‘Von Trabbi Und Acetylen - Die Technikentwicklung’, 114. 
66 Augustine, ‘The Failure of the East German Electronics Industry’, 98. 
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innovations according to the needs of the plan.67 In the late 1950s, an increase in 
COMECON trade led to an improvement of growth, partially due to a degree of 
lenience on the private sector.68 
 
1960s 
In 1961, the SED famously responded to the ongoing emigration problem by 
building the Berlin wall, which was effective in slowing the population decline 
(Figure 2).69 However, the wall itself laid bare the failures of socialism in the 
GDR and thus suggested a need for reform. 70 At the same time, any meaningful 
deviation from past economic policy threatened the ideological position of the 
SED.71 Nonetheless, the Ulbricht government, more able to focus on longer-term 
objectives with the short-term emigration issue resolved,  went ahead with 
economic reforms under the “New economic system.” In this, SOEs were to be 
permitted to retrain profits and central planning was to be replaced with more 
indirect “economic levers”.72 Faced with continuing economic difficulties, science 
and technology, and in particular “High Technology” in sectors like electronics 
again seemed like the only way to overcome the structural obstacles the GDR’s 
economy faced. In 1963, technology was defined as a factor of production like 
capital or labour in the SED’s formal ideology – analogous to the treatment of 









67 Förtsch, ‘Wissenschafts- und Technologiepolitik in der DDR’, 20. 
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70 Laitko, ‘Das Reformpaket der sechziger Jahre’, 56. 
71 Laitko, 42. 
72 Ritschl and Vonyó, ‘The Roots of Economic Failure’, 517. 
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Figure 3: Graduates per 1000 workers in industry 
 
 
Source: Franzmann 2006, ZA 826674 
 
The 1960s saw a great deal of reform in the areas of Science and Technology as 
well. The education sector was successfully expanded, as can be seen by the near 
tripling of graduates per 1000 workers in industry from 4 to almost 12 over the 
1960s (Figure 3). Moreover, investments into high-tech research were 
prioritised.75 There was a plan to concentrate research staff in industry (which 
could now pay for R&D through profits) rather than science institutes, and the 
university research system was reorganised along bureaucratic lines, breaking 
the authority that senior faculty previously had.76 The Science Secretariat was 
promoted into a full Ministry, which prioritised research on its own terms: 
promoting research into the substitution of lignite for oil, microelectronics, and 
 
74 Franzmann, ‘Berufsausbildung Und Studium in Der Ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik (DDR) von 1960 Bis 1989. Ein Überblick Anhand Der Amtlichen DDR-Statistik.’ 
75 Dale, Between State Capitalism and Globalisation, 171; Ritschl, ‘An Exercise in Futility’, 518. 
76 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 100. 
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energy efficiency.77 In this period we can already see negative effects of political 
meddling in research, such as in microelectronics where researchers were 
required to explore avenues outside of transistor technology, which reduced their 
productivity.78 This was also when the practice of state-sponsored industrial 
espionage and copying of research emerged.79 
 
Ultimately the reforms of the Ulbricht government could never be implemented. 
Investments ran into diminishing returns, accurately determining ROI absent a 
stock market was difficult, and profit-oriented management with its spectre of 
layoffs and restructuring provoked worker opposition.80 At the same time, R&D 




The 1970s began with what was for all intents and purposes a coup d’état, as 
Erich Honecker took over the reins from Walter Ulbricht in a return to Marxist 
orthodoxy. The GDR avoided the 1973 oil crisis due to the COMECON’s pricing 
policy of asking the lagged five-year average price for commodities. In fact, the 
GDR exported refined products produced from cheap COMECON oil to acquire 
foreign reserves.82 Nonetheless, the balance sheet deteriorated, as the past 
decades of technological improvements had quite often been bought with foreign 
reserves, leading to a deteriorating balance sheet.83 The GDR accumulated over 
12 billion USD in foreign debt, which led to acute issues with financing imports - 
Honecker’s  “Union of Economic and Social policy” had financed what was 
 
77 Förtsch, ‘Wissenschafts- und Technologiepolitik in der DDR’, 26. 
78 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 7. 
79 Augustine, 9. 
80 Dale, Between State Capitalism and Globalisation, 175; Ritschl, ‘An Exercise in Futility’, 517–
19. 
81 Laitko, ‘Das Reformpaket der sechziger Jahre’, 45. 
82 Stokes, ‘East Germany and the Oil Crises of the 1970s’, 139. 
83 Ritschl, ‘An Exercise in Futility’, 523. 
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essentially consumption spending through a welfare system through foreign 
borrowing.84  
 
Academically, the Honecker Regime pursued centralisation of research and 
development into centralised institutes regardless of the suitability of local 
conditions.85 Moreover, the effects of secrecy intensified, as Honecker placed 
more responsibility into the hands of the Stasi. This culminated in the ousting of 
Werner Hartmann, who had been a driving force in the GDR’s microelectronics 
research field, in 1974.86 Interestingly, this dismissal occurred after the SED 
recognised the critical importance of semiconductors and promoted massive 
investments into the field in the hopes of establishing a sort of monopoly over 
microelectronics in the Eastern bloc. 
 
1980s 
By the late 1970s, the previously generous terms of COMECON turned less 
advantageous, as the supply of oil was cut and prices were now well above well 
market levels. This led to crucial shortages across sectors, particularly in the 
petrochemical industry.87 Moreover, the high debt from the 70s spiralled out of 
control and in 1983 the GDR found itself unable to import critical basic goods, 
and was only saved by a West German credit of 1 Bn DM.88 The oil problems and 
foreign exchange shortages led to a further round of autarky programs, 
attempting to substitute oil with lignite.89 These investments were very 
unproductive, and displaced other spending, such as elsewhere in the chemical 
sector.90 The balance of payment consistently worsened, and by the late 80s only 
flagship projects like the high-tech sector and certain chemistry projects received 
significant investment or even refurbishment, as growing parts of the GDR’s 
capital stock were simply left to depreciate away. 
 
84 Ritschl, 520. 
85 Buthmann, Versagtes Vertrauen, 256. 
86 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 184–86. 
87 Stokes, ‘East Germany and the Oil Crises of the 1970s’, 140. 
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At the same time, the research establishment suffered from excessive 
centralisation, which made recruitment of skilled individuals difficult.91 
Furthermore, research in many important sectors, such as microelectronics and 
optics, suffered greatly from the burdens of secrecy imposed by the copying of 
foreign technologies and the turn towards military production. By the late 1980s, 
it was not just the economy that had ossified and was in crisis, but the weight of 
over thirty years of political meddling in the scientific enterprise had reduced the 
ability for researchers to pursue creative avenues of research and the interest of 
firms to explore ways to improve production.  
 
 
Data and Methodology 
Considering this historical background, I want to investigate the link between 
patents and productivity in the GDR. Is the relationship as strong as in other 
countries? Why or why not? The specifics of the patent system and the historical 
background lead me to the hypothesis that the relationship between patenting 
activity and productivity growth is weaker than in other countries, but still 
positive and present. The relationship is likely to be weakened by the 
institutional context: firstly, being a planned economy, there is less likelihood of 
productive “knowledge spillovers” within the economy, as managers in firms are 
more concerned with maintaining current output than laying the groundwork for 
future productivity growth. Secondly, while the dominance of the 
“Wirtschaftspatent” reduces the payoff to inventors (especially at the very high 
end), there are still material rewards for patenting. At the same time, the costs 
of patenting, both directly in terms of fees and indirectly in terms of “giving 
away” knowledge to the competition, are absent – so the incentive to patent is 
still relatively strong. In the following sections, I introduce my strategy for 
testing this hypothesis using regression analysis and comparing the results to 
junctures in the historical record. 
 




Due to my scepticism about the comparability of data employed by GM2020 for 
the GDR and FRG, I instead constructed a patent dataset for the GDR along the 
same lines as they did for the FRG. The data on patents in the GDR is scraped 
from DEPATISnet by selecting the application country as belonging to the GDR. 
The data spans the years from 1950 to 1990, covering almost the entire lifetime 
of the GDR – 1949 was omitted because the establishment of AfEP and the 
publication of the GDR’s patent law only took place in 1950. Unlike data used in 
earlier research, the dataset is highly granular, down to the level of the 
individual patent, and it contains patents from all relevant economic actors: 
SOEs, private inventors, and foreign patentees. This granularity provides the 
researcher with a wealth of information, but also necessitates careful data 
preparation to avoid introducing errors. The first challenge is identifying the 
origin of the patentee – while all patents are from the GDR, and foreign 
patenting was rarer in the GDR than elsewhere, there are still many 
international patents, both from the Eastern and Western blocs.92 While the data 
is in a structured format, and prepared using OCR on scanned patent forms, the 
data is not always consistent, and care must be taken to identify the 
characteristics of a foreign-owned patent. Country codes are present in many 
cases but are not consistent with regards to differentiating the GDR from the 
FRG. To identify foreign patents conclusively without creating many false 
positives, the data is therefore run through a filter that identifies certain country 
codes and other identifiers. Differentiating between foreign and domestic patents 
is helpful to understand the effect to which the international transfer of 
knowledge that they represent affected productivity in the GDR. The application 
date is taken to be the variable of interest as this is the point at which the R&D 
process has resulted in an invention – it is from this point that positive effects on 
productivity should be expected. It is chosen over the date of registration, as this 
depends crucially on administrative factors of the patent office that have little to 
do with the actual innovation process. To take advantage of the granularity of 
 
92 At over 40.000 they make up nearly 20% of the entire stock! 
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the economic data, which covers 16 distinct sectors, patents are assigned to the 
appropriate economic sector using the MERIT concordance table between IPC 
and ISIC and assigning the ISIC values to the appropriate industrial sectors.93 
The same method is employed in GM2020 for the assignment of patents to 
sectors in the FRG and is thus demonstrated as relatively robust. My patent 
dataset is thus more comprehensive and detailed, as well as more long-running 




TFP is measured in the standard Cobb-Douglas form as the share of output not 
explained by the capital stock of labour, as specified in Equation 1 in which 𝑌𝑗𝑡 is 
output for sector 𝑗 and time 𝑡, 𝐴𝑗𝑡 is Total Factor Productivity, 𝐾𝑗𝑡 is the capital 
stock and 𝐿𝑗𝑡 is the labour force.   
 𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝐴𝑗𝑡𝐾𝑗𝑡
0.33𝐿𝑗𝑡
0.67 1 
The Heske dataset is the most up-to-date and comprehensive account of the 
output, workforce, and investment across sectors in the GDR, but it does not 
contain TFP data. As such, it is necessary to construct a series on the capital 
stock to calculate TFP, which requires making assumptions to impute an initial 
capital stock. In GM2020, only the period from 1971 onwards is covered, due to 
the coverage of the patent and espionage series. Two techniques are used to 
calculate TFP: For the main specification, a method derived from Caselli (2005), 
which calculates an initial capital stock using a steady state approach is used.  
 𝐾𝑗𝑡 = 𝐼𝑗𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑗𝑡−1 2 
The Capital stock 𝐾 at time 𝑡 in sector is given by Equation 2, and is simply the 
previous capital stock less depreciation and plus investment. To find an initial 
capital stock, Caselli proposes using a steady state approach in which the initial 







93 Verspagen, van Moergastel, and Slabbers, ‘MERIT Concordance Table: IPC - ISIC (Rev. 2)’. 
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In Equation 3 Investment is 𝐼, the geometric growth rate is 𝑔𝑗, and the 
depreciation rate is 𝛿.94 Glitz and Meyersson calculate the geometric growth rate 
from 1950-1970, which is before the period of study. Like Caselli, they select a 
depreciation rate of rate of 6%.95 From this, a TFP series is constructed for each 
of the 16 sectors used by Heske. 
 
They check the robustness of this approach by also employing a method proposed 
by the authors of the Penn World Table for use in transition economies. Inklaar 
and Timmer (2013) argue that in the case of economies undergoing a major 
transition, it can be more accurate to use an initial capital-output ratio of 2.6.96 
Both methods give relatively similar results in the GM2020 model, which is not 
surprising given that 20 years of depreciation and investment have been able to 
correct any initial mistakes by the time their analysis starts.  
 
In the case of extending the analysis all the way to the beginning of the series, 
the choice of an initial capital stock is of course far more salient. As such, I have 
calculated another capital (and TFP) series based on the study of the GDR’s 
early economy by Ritschl and Vonyó (2014) (hereafter: RV2014). They conduct a 
comprehensive review of war damage, dismantling, and investment to calculate 
a capital stock for the post-war years in East Germany, allowing them to report 
gross and net capital stocks, output, and employment in industry for the GDR in 
1950.97  Making their data usable was a multi-step process due to the different 
price levels and coverage of a slightly different share of the economy in their 
paper. Firstly, I had to calculate deflators for the 1944 and 1939 price levels 
using data from Appendix 1 to calculate the appropriate value for the net capital 
stock in 1936 in 1939 prices, as displayed in Table 1. 
 
94 Caselli, ‘Chapter 9 Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences’; in Glitz and Meyersson, 
‘Industrial Espionage and Productivity’, 1075–76. 
95 Glitz and Meyersson, ‘Industrial Espionage and Productivity’, 1076. 
96 Inklaar and Timmer, ‘Capital, Labor and TFP in PWT8.0’; in Glitz and Meyersson, ‘Industrial 
Espionage and Productivity’. 
97 Ritschl and Vonyó, ‘The Roots of Economic Failure’. 
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Table 1: 1936 figures in 1939 prices 
Year Price Level 
Gross Capital 
stock Net Capital Stock 
1936 1939 16000 9195,83 
1936 1944 17260 9920 
Source: Ritschl and Vonyó 2014, own calculations.98 
  
Subsequently, I calculated the appropriate 1950 output, capital, and labour 
figures using Tables A1, 2, and 3. To be able to use these figures with the Heske 
dataset, I made the fundamental assumption that the TFP and capital/worker 
ratio would be the same for marginal workers reported in the Heske data but not 
in the RV2014 data – as the number of workers was approximately 30% higher 
in the Heske dataset. As such, I scaled up output, capital, and workers linearly. 
The results are shown below, in Table 2. From this, I was able to compute an 
approximate “deflator” from the 1939 price levels to the price levels employed by 
Heske, and thereby estimate the initial capital stock. 
  
Table 2: 1950 figures in 1939 prices 
Year Output 
Gross 
Capital Net Capital Workers 
1936 7600 16000 9195,829 1937 
1950 6163,6 13504 7816,454 2355,392 
1950 - scaled 8020,505 17572,34 10171,31 3065 
Source: Ritschl and Vonyó 2014, own calculations.99 
 
 
98 Ritschl and Vonyó. 
99 Ritschl and Vonyó. 
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Table 3: Initial capital stocks calculated according to different baselines 
Source Output Capital 
Capital-
Output Ratio 
Heske - Steady State 4846,783 9242 1,91 
Heske - PWT 4846,783 12601,64 2,6 
Ritschl and Vonyó 4846,783 6146,515 1,27 
Source: Heske 2013, Glitz and Meyersson 2020, Ritschl and Vonyó 2014, own calculations.100 
 
The initial capital stocks are visible in Table 3, and it is surprising how low the 
capital-output ratio implied in RV2014 is compared to the initial capital-output 
ratios calculated in GM2020 using the different approaches they used. 
Nevertheless, the calculation of the initial capital stock is not enough, as it still 
leaves the question on how to allocate it to different sectors, as the RV2014 data 
applies to the GDR as a whole. Again adapting the GM2020 method, I use two 
approaches. The first was to allocate the total capital based on the share of the 
total capital that each sector had in the Steady State model by Caselli. This 
approach combines the logical appeal of the Caselli method with the empirical 
basis of the RV2014 data. The other approach is to take a flat capital-labour ratio 
from the capital stock calculated from Ritschl and Vonyó and apply it to all 











100 Heske, ‘Value Added, Employment and Capital Expenditures in the East German Industry, 
1950-2000’; Glitz and Meyersson, ‘Industrial Espionage and Productivity’; Ritschl and Vonyó, 
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Figure 4: Whole-Economy TFP figures 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the differences of TFP in the entire economy between both 
datasets do not appear large at first glance. But Figure 5, which relates the 
different TFP series to patenting intensity, reveals that some sectors are 
strongly affected. Log figures are used in order to make short-term differences 
more easily apparent – particularly the patent series appear extremely smooth 
in level terms but actually show a high degree of variation over time when 
examining the logged series. From the figure three major findings are apparent: 
firstly, that the TFP series rapidly converge, independent of initial capital 
stocks, suggesting a robustness of the approach that is confirmed by regressions 
run on the different series. Secondly, there is substantial difference across 
 
101 Heske, ‘Value Added, Employment and Capital Expenditures in the East German Industry, 
1950-2000’; Glitz and Meyersson, ‘Industrial Espionage and Productivity’; Ritschl and Vonyó, 
‘The Roots of Economic Failure’. 
 
Source: Heske 2013, Glitz and Meyersson 2020, Ritschl and Vonyó 2014, own calculations.101  
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sectors: some have generally higher productivity than patent intensity, while 
some have generally lower patent intensities. Finally, the temporal relationship 
between patenting intensities differs: whereas the trends go in the same 
direction in some sectors, they go in the opposite direction in others. Given the 
earlier exploration of differences in patenting activity by sector, this is not 
wholly unsurprising given the inherent differences in patenting intensities 
across sectors discussed earlier. Ultimately, I am confident that my TFP series is 
a substantial improvement on the series employed by GM2020 since it 
substitutes empirical study of the GDR’s capital stock for relatively crude 
estimation techniques. 
 
Figure 5: Different sectoral log TFP series and log Patents/Gross Value Added 
 
Source: Heske 2013, Glitz and Meyersson 2020, Ritschl and Vonyó 2014, own calculations.102 
Patenting Intensity is defined as the number of patent applications divided by gross value 
added. 
 
102 Heske, ‘Value Added, Employment and Capital Expenditures in the East German Industry, 
1950-2000’; Glitz and Meyersson, ‘Industrial Espionage and Productivity’; Ritschl and Vonyó, 




In addition to the panel data employed for a direct verification of GM2020’s 
approach, I have also found material on education levels, investments in 
research and development, I have also drawn on reports on the conditions of the 
R&D establishment in the GDR. Unfortunately, these are not suited to being 
incorporated in the regression analysis because they are either spotlight reports 
on matters within a single year or they are time series with large and irregular 
gaps. Due to these shortcomings, I will touch on this material in my discussion of 




My methodology is oriented significantly on the approach used Glitz and 
Meyersson in GM2020, namely employing panel data analysis to identify 
relationships over time.103 In the earlier literature review, I have explored the 
many ways in which patenting is linked towards productivity, both because of 
the direct transmission of knowledge through patents and the know-how 
acquired in the process of generating a patentable invention. As such, all other 
things being equal, a period with a larger number of patent applications may be 
followed by a period of relatively faster productivity growth. While company-
specific know-how being gained might be instantaneous (or even precede the 
patent application), knowledge spillovers can only occur after the knowledge 
contained in the patent is made public through the application, and 
implementation might add a further delay. As such, the interval for the 
differencing of the dependent variable is chosen as three years.  
 
As mentioned in the literature review, predictions of productivity are often 
implemented by first calculating a patent stock as a proxy for the stock of 
knowledge. For several reasons, this is impractical in the case of the GDR, so 
instead the number of patent applications is used as a variable to describe 
 
103 Glitz and Meyersson, ‘Industrial Espionage and Productivity’. 
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additions to the stock of knowledge. This implicitly assumes a depreciation rate 
of zero for the knowledge stock, an assumption also made in the GM2020 model, 
based on the findings of Griliches and Lichtenberg, who determined that models 
using the zero-depreciation assumption worked well in predicting American TFP 
across industries.104 Moreover, the future trajectory of TFP is crucially 
determined by current TFP: the more productive a sector is already, the more 
difficult it is to create additional TFP growth. As such, the regression model is 
specified as in Equation 4: 
 Δ𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡+3 = 𝛽 × 𝑙𝑛𝑃jt − 𝛾 × 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑗 + 𝜋𝑡+3 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡+3 4 
 
In which the difference in log TFP at time 𝑡 + 3 is predicted from the logged 
patenting intensity 𝑃𝑗𝑡 and the logged TFP at time 𝑡. To account for the different 
patenting intensities for each sector, the sector fixed effects 𝜆𝑗 are also added, 
and to account for the potential of technological improvements that do not differ 
by sector, the year fixed effects 𝜋𝑡+3 are added.  
 
The three-year gap leads to overlapping windows, which requires a new 
calculation of the standard errors to account for this artificial serial correlation. 
This can be solved by calculating p-values using the bootstrap-based t-procedure 
proposed by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) because it weeds out this 
artificial correlation.105 It works by creating “pseudo-samples” from the data to 
calculate the actual distribution of the statistic of interest in the sample by 




104 Glitz and Meyersson; Griliches and Lichtenberg, ‘R and D and Productivity at the Industry 
Level’. 
105 Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, ‘Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered 
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Replication of Glitz and Meyersson 
The first step I took based on my concerns with the comparability of data 
between the GDR and FRG in the GM2020 paper was to run the same 
regressions with my own dataset. In theory, to approach the same question using 
data that is prepared in the same way for both countries should provide more 
reliable results. The AfEP data on yearly patent applications of Kombinate used 
in GM2020 does not contain any patents from foreign firms, which as has been 
demonstrated in the historiography section were vital suppliers of technology to 
the GDR in several key areas in which the GDR was weak. Moreover, it does not 
contain any patents applied for by private inventors. As such, it might be 
considered a dataset of patents of major businesses rather than a dataset of GDR 
patenting more generally.  
 
Table 4: Regression results using the AfEP and DEPATISnet data 
 










Espionage   -0.0420* -0.0481+ -0.0405* -0.0523+ 
 
(-1.93) (-4.23) (-1.95) (-4.33) 
Patents Gap  0.0743** -0.0815** 0.0708** -0.0381 
 
(2.46) (-2.26) (2.54) (-1.58) 









P-value WB    0.109 0.025 0.128 0.0106 
R-squared     0.352 0.570 0.355 0.564 
Observations   240 240 240 240 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 
Table 4 demonstrates the results obtained by replicating the GM2020 method 
using my own patent series: Regressing the gap in the TFP between East and 
West Germany on independent variables that are lagged by three years, adding 
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year and sector fixed effects and clustering standard errors at the sectoral level. 
The results are striking: where in GM2020, the inclusion of the lagged TFP gap 
removes the significance of the lagged patent gap and leaves only the inflows of 
industrial espionage and the lagged TFP as significant explanatory variables, 
the results are remarkably different when using the DEPATISnet data:  when 
regressing the TFP gap on lagged espionage and patents and controlling for the 
lagged TFP gap, the coefficient for the patent gap becomes negative and remains 
significant at the 5%-level. Not only that, but its magnitude is also twice as high 
as that of the inflows of industrial espionage (although granted, the latter is far 
more significant, at the 0.1% level).  
 
While significance alone is of course not everything, the fact that the coefficient 
for the patent gap is twice as high as that for espionage is quite remarkable. Of 
course, this would not be much of a concern – it would in fact be rather delightful 
to find an additional statistically significant coefficient so quickly for the variable 
of interest. However, the coefficient is negative. This means that the empirical 
model employed by Glitz and Meyersson predicts that patents in the GDR 
actually hurt productivity – since a larger patent gap would be associated with a 
smaller productivity gap.  
 
The relationship holds when subjected to the same robustness checks as 
employed by Glitz and Meyersson, which includes several instrumental variable 




Table 5: Single-Country Results - FRG 
 (1) (2) 
 Log TFP Growth Log TFP Growth 
   
Log Patents/GVA 0.146+ 0.0715** 
 (4.95) (2.73) 
   
Log TFP  -0.275** 
  (-2.87) 
   
P-value WB 0.00100 0.0831 
Adj. R-Squared 0.306 0.384 
Observations 272 272 
   
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 
In Table 5, the results for a regression of logged TFP on three-year lagged 
patenting activity is presented, with and without controlling for three-year 
lagged TFP are presented. As described above, the regression uses year and 
sector fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the sectoral level.  
The coefficients for the FRG are around what would be expected: there is a 
positive coefficient of lagged patent applications on TFP, which becomes less 
significant and smaller when controlling for lagged TFP. The coefficient for log 
TFP is negative, as would be predicted. This may have several reasons: Firstly, it 
may reflect international catch-up to the technology frontier, which is slower in 
higher-productivity sectors with less scope for catch-up growth. Secondly, it may 
simply reflect a tendency towards diminishing returns. At least for the FRG, 
findings are thus broadly in line with what would be expected given the link 
between patenting and productivity discussed earlier. 
 
As such, this same regression model is now applied in the GDR, and the results 
are reported in Table 6.  
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Table 6: Single-Country Results – GDR (GM TFP series) 
 (1) (2) 
 Log TFP Growth Log TFP Growth 
   
Log Patents/GVA 0.104+ 0.00362 
 (4.60) (0.30) 
   
Log TFP  -0.211+ 
  (-5.37) 
   
P-value WB 0.117 0.757 
Adj. R-Squared 0.668 0.742 
Observations 592 592 
   
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 
Here, the results are quite different. When not controlling for logged TFP, the 
coefficient of patents is highly significant at the 0.1% level, and it is two orders of 
magnitude larger than in the FRG – but this impression is quickly overturned 
when considering the Wild Bootstrap p values, according to which the coefficient 
is not significant at the 10% level. Once the control is introduced, the coefficient 
on patents is completely non-significant, even though the number of observations 




Table 7: Single-Country Results – GDR (Ritschl and Vonyó TFP series – 
Steady State) 
 (1) (2) 
 Log TFP Growth Log TFP Growth 
   
Log Patents/GVA 0.0967+ -0.000792 
 (5.11) (-0.07) 
   
Log TFP  -0.211+ 
  (-4.59) 
   
P-value WB 0.0951 0.945 
Adj. R-Squared 0.592 0.678 
Observations 592 592 
   
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 
As shown in Table 7, these results are broadly confirmed when using the RV 
TFP series in which initial capital stocks are assigned based on the Caselli 
steady state method – the coefficient on log TFP in specification 2 is even of the 
exact same magnitude as in the GM TFP series.  
 
Table 8: Single-Country Results – GDR (Ritschl and Vonyó TFP series – PWT) 
 (1) (2) 
 Log TFP Growth Log TFP Growth 
   
Log Patents/GVA 0.00204 -0.0913*** 
 (0.15) (-3.28) 
   
Log TFP  -0.337+ 
  (-6.85) 
   
P-value WB 0.856 0.0450 
Adj. R-Squared 0.287 0.488 
Observations 592 592 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 
Table 8 shows the regression results when using the Ritschl TFP series with the 
PWT-method giving equal capital-output ratios to each sector. With this series, 
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there is again a surprising outcome because the coefficient of patenting on log 
TFP growth in specification 2 is negative and highly significant. However, this is 
driven by sector 8, meaning to coke production and oil refining, whose capital 
stock is undervalued given the PWT method – hardly surprising, considering the 
substantial Nazi-era investments into the refineries in Leuna, which would 
continue providing a backbone to the GDR’s petrochemical industry. Results 
without sector 8 are reported in Table A 6. 
 
When adding controls such as the number of collaborators or a further lag of the 
dependent variable, the results are not substantially changed. Thus, in 
conclusion, there appears to be no statistically significant relationship between a 
sector’s TFP growth and earlier patenting activity when accounting for the level 




The results of the regressions clearly show that in the GDR, patent applications 
are not a suitable indicator of innovative activity that is transmitted into 
productivity growth – mostly irrespective of the measure of productivity that is 
employed. This stands in contrast with the FRG, and stands in contrast with the 
results obtained by Glitz and Meyersson. I argue that there are fundamentally 
two factors that lead to this non-significant result: firstly, the amount or quality 
of “innovative knowledge” contained within each patent were lower. Secondly, 
the “innovative knowledge” contained within the patent was not generally 
applied and so did not spread throughout the economy. The first aspect does 
provide an interesting avenue of further research: further information on patents 
in the GDR does exist, even though it is in paper archives and difficult to access. 
However, the second aspect is arguably more interesting in terms of our 
fundamental research question, because it is inherently tied into the valuation of 




Some reasons why patents may have been of lower “quality” in the GDR are the 
planning of innovation, the working conditions of inventors, and the incentives 
inherent in the patenting system itself. Innovation was part of the GDR’s 
economic plan from the very beginning, and this is reflected in the attention that 
top-level politicians lavished on various technological “Wunderwaffen”. 
Unfortunately for them, this chasing of miracle cures was not effective, and 
neither was the innovation planning system more generally. This was due to the 
classic information problem common to all economic planners, who simply cannot 
knoe all they need to know to effectively make forward-looking economic plans. 
As such, research problems were often behind the global “state of the art” and 
had to be aborted or changed frequently, and projects that were carried out often 
merely replicated what had already been achieved elsewhere.107 Additionally, 
working conditions were suboptimal – while the number of researchers was 
relatively high (even higher than in the FRG relative to the number of 
employees) they did not have access to adequate support staff or technical 
equipment.108 Expenditure on R&D also made up only half as large of a share of 
turnover in the GDR as in the FRG.109 
 
Secondly, the patent system itself created incentives for over-patenting. Patents 
were essentially free, which meant that there was very little harm in attempting 
to receive a patent on inventions even of dubious value – and neither was there a 
reason not to split a collection of related inventions into multiple patents. At the 
same time, there were rewards for patenting: they were lower than in a market 
economy, but still existed in the form of monetary rewards and civil honours. 
There was also no reason to fear that other firms would “work around” the 
patent and erode the rightsholder’s market share in a planned economy. Trends 
in overall patenting intensity are erratic as seen in Figure 6, which makes it less 
likely that there was a consistent loosening of requirements over time to meet 
plan goals. 
 
107 Lindig, ‘Ausgewählte Rahmenbedingungen Des Erfinderischen Schaffens in Der DDR’, 23. 
108 Lindig, 10. 
109 Bentley, Research and Technology in the Former German Democratic Republic, 180. 
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Generally, then, there are many reasons to believe that the average patent in the 
GDR had a lower economic value than in other countries, such as the FRG. 
However, there exists a substantial amount of data on the economic application 
of patents in the GDR, and researchers who recover and analyse it might find an 
interesting avenue of further research on the specifics of patenting in the GDR.  
 
Of course, the other factor is the generally lower performance of planned 
economies in implementing innovations (this also fundamentally drives the 
“value” or “quality” of the patent itself, of course). The results of the analysis 
might cautiously be interpreted as a confirmation of the anecdotal evidence on 
the refusal or inability to implement state-of-the-art manufacturing techniques, 
like for example in the microelectronics industry, where this problem held up 
high-level research for years.110 Even in the case of innovations generated by in-
house R&D programmes, there were strong forces at play against their 
implementation, partially because there was a great deal of siloing between R&D 
and production staff and there was practically no expectation for production staff 
to implement novelties. Interestingly, one way that inventors sought to overcome 
this was apparently to put their bosses down as co-inventors to align their 
incentives with the uptake of the patent.111 Finally, as noted above, the GDR had 
suffered from an outflow of human capital before the building of the wall, which 
reduced the number of people who would be able effectively use knowledge as a 
factor of production. In a time series analysis in which national productivity 
trends are regressed on national patenting activity and controlling for the share 
of graduates as well as past TFP, there is in fact a positive significant coefficient 
on both patenting and the share of graduates – but this result is simply a result 
of the non-stationarity of our TFP growth variable (which trends downwards) 
and our graduate share variable (which trends upwards) and disappears when 
employing first-differences.  
 
 
110 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 126. 
111 Lindig, ‘Ausgewählte Rahmenbedingungen Des Erfinderischen Schaffens in Der DDR’, 55. 
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Figure 6: Patent Applications/Gross Value Added in the GDR 
 
Data Source: DEPATISnet, Heske (2013) 
 
Overall, my hypothesis that the relationship between patenting and productivity 
is less strongly positive in the GDR than in other countries, but still positive, 
could not be confirmed by the regression results when drawing on the entire 
country’s patent stock. This is itself a fascinating result, as it suggests that the 
institutional structure of the GDR’s innovation system was set up in a seriously 
suboptimal way: patents as a critical element of the innovative process did not 
fulfil their purpose of creating a stock of useful knowledge to be disseminated 
through the economy, generally speaking.  
 
However, the historical record provides several clues that further research on 
how the transmission of patenting activity into productivity worked in the GDR 
would be fruitful. One approach is valuing the patents to identify the subset of 
patents that were particularly useful. Potential approaches include taking 
advantage of the national-level data on patents’ implementation from the AfEP 
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archives or company-level data on R&D staffing, investment, patenting, and 
productivity. Another approach, which was planned for this thesis but impossible 
to implement due to issues of data availability, quality, and consistency, is to 
investigate the difference between firm-level and national-level political pressure 
on researchers: for example, recall the political interference in the 
microelectronics research establishment. Or consider the differences in the 
Stasi’s power between the different chemical Kombinate. By contrasting 
company-level political interference with interference on a national level, 
valuable insights might be gained into the mechanisms by which politically 
repressive systems degrade their economies’ ability to innovate, which would 




In this thesis I have attempted to answer the research question “what was the 
relationship between patenting and productivity in the GDR” by adapting an 
econometric model from the literature and applying it my own time series on 
patent data and TFP in order to increase the timeframe of the analysis and 
enhance the robustness of the results. To do so, I have introduced some 
literature on the link between patents and productivity more generally, as well 
as specifics to consider in the context of a planned economy. I then related these 
specificities to the GDR’s historiography, leading me to two conclusions and my 
hypothesis: firstly, I conclude that the planned economy in the GDR reduced the 
tendency for innovations to be transmitted across the economy and implemented 
in improved products and production. Secondly, patents in the GDR likely 
provide a more direct measure of R&D activity than elsewhere because its costs 
are so low – but this tends to increase the share of economically useless patents. 
As such, my hypothesis follows: the relationship between patenting and 
productivity in the GDR is likely to be smaller than elsewhere but still positive.  
 
This hypothesis is tested empirically using a dynamic panel regression on 
productivity growth and patenting in the GDR, and cannot be confirmed: using 
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the entirety of the GDR’s patent stock, no statistically significant link between 
patenting and productivity could be established once controlling for past TFP. 
This is true regardless of the TFP series used. When compared to the historical 
record, it suggests that the hypothesis was too optimistic, likely because of the 
low economic usefulness of the average GDR patent. Data sources that exist, but 
could not be exploited for this thesis, such as AfEP data on the actual use of 
patents or historical company accounts, could provide an avenue for further 
fruitful study. In fact, the original vision for this research project was to 
undertake a difference-in-difference analysis on the effects of Stasi replacement 
of R&D executives at important GDR innovators. It could not be implemented 
because of challenges in reliably assigning patents to economic entities and the 
difficulty of accessing German paper archives during covid – but such research 
might allow further understanding of political interference as a brake on 
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Table A 1: Including the number of collaborators on a patent 
 (1) (2) 
 c3ln_GDR_TFP_ritschl c3ln_GDR_TFP_ritschl 
   
ln_GDR_patents_gva -0.000593 -0.000592 
 (-0.05) (-0.05) 
   
TFP -0.209*** -0.208*** 
 (-3.86) (-3.50) 
   
ln_GDR_collabsize -0.0109  
 (-0.17)  
   
GDR_collabsize  -0.00320 
  (-0.20) 
   
P-value WB 0.957 0.950 
Adj. R-Squared 0.678 0.678 
Observations 592 592 
   
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 
Table A 2: GDR, using first differences (GM TFP) 
 (1) (2) 
 c3ln_GDR_TFP c3ln_GDR_TFP 
   
D.ln_GDR_patents_gva 0.0000118 0.0308*** 
 (0.00) (3.41) 
   
D.TFP  0.526*** 
  (3.52) 
   
P-value WB 1 0.00901 
Adj. R-Squared 0.474 0.512 
Observations 576 576 
   
t statistics in parentheses 





Table A 3: GDR, using first differences (Ritschl and Vonyo TFP series) 
 (1) (2) 
 c3ln_GDR_TFP_ritschl c3ln_GDR_TFP_ritschl 
   
D.ln_GDR_patents_gva 0.00290 0.0324*** 
 (0.31) (3.69) 
   
D.TFP  0.490** 
  (2.88) 
   
P-value WB 0.747 0.00501 
Adj. R-Squared 0.422 0.458 
Observations 576 576 
   
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 
Table A 4: FRG, using first differences 
 (1) (2) 
 c3FRGlnTFP c3FRGlnTFP 
   
D.ln_FRG_patents_gva 0.0387 -0.0398 
 (1.39) (-1.26) 
   
D.ln_FRG_TFP  -0.770*** 
  (-3.51) 
   
P-value WB 0.302 0.406 
Adj. R-Squared 0.575 0.649 
Observations 256 256 
   
t statistics in parentheses 





Table A 5: Including a strongly lagged dependent variable 
 (1) (2) 
 c3ln_GDR_TFP c3ln_GDR_TFP 
   
ln_GDR_patents_gva 0.0886*** -0.00370 
 (3.04) (-0.23) 
   
l3c3ln_GDR_TFP 0.191* 0.0842 
 (1.96) (0.66) 
   
ln_GDR_TFP  -0.229+ 
  (-5.04) 
   
Adj. R-Squared 0.572 0.663 
Observations 544 544 
   
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, + p<0.001 
 
 











P-value WB 0.349 
Adj. R-Squared 0.600 
Observations 555 
  
t statistics in parentheses 












Table A 7: Including human capital variables 
 (1) (2) 
 c3GDR_lnTFP_ritschl_total c3GDR_lnTFP_ritschl_total 
   
GDR_ln_patents_gva_total 0.0581** 0.0628** 
 (2.61) (2.73) 
   
ln_gradshare_total 0.143*  
 (1.94)  
   
TFP -0.419* -0.304 
 (-2.00) (-1.46) 
   
ln_gradshare_nonservice  0.0712 
  (1.39) 
   
Adj. R-Squared 0.374 0.326 
Observations 26 26 
 
